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PROVISIONAL APPLICATION OF TREATIES AND OTHER TOPICS:  THE 
SEVENTY-SECOND SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 
 
Forthcoming in 115 American Journal of International Law (2021) 
 
By Sean D. Murphy* 
 
 The International Law Commission (ILC) held its seventy-second session from April 26 to 
June 4 and from July 5 to August 6, 2021 in Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mahmoud Hmoud 
(Jordan).1 This session was originally scheduled for the summer of 2020, but had to be postponed 
due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.2 The pandemic continued in 2021 to present 
health risks and travel difficulties for certain members; consequently, the Commission for the first 
time in its history held its session in a hybrid manner, with many members physically present in 
Geneva, while others participated online by means of Zoom. That approach required certain 
adjustments to the Commission’s methods of work, but allowed the Commission to move forward 
in addressing the several topics on its current program of work.  
 
Specifically, the Commission completed the second reading of two topics:  
provisional application of treaties; and protection of the atmosphere. Progress was also made in 
developing draft articles on immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, draft 
articles on succession of states with respect to state responsibility, and draft conclusions on general 
principles of law. Additionally, the Commission convened a study group on sea-level rise in 
relation to international law, which focused its work during this session on matters relating to the 
law of the sea. The Commission also added a topic to its long-term work program on subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of international law, and elected a new member to fill a casual 
vacancy. 
 
I. HYBRID PROCEEDINGS 
 
 For the first time since the Commission commenced its work in 1949, its session was held 
in a hybrid fashion, so that members could participate both in-person and online (the latter facing 
health risks and travel difficulties due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic).3 For those members 
present in Geneva, a larger room than usual was used to allow for social distancing, all members 
wore face masks unless speaking, and members could not be accompanied by any assistants during 
the first half of the session. Meeting times were compressed for most of the session and coffee 
breaks were eliminated. The Swiss government assisted the Commission by providing certain 
exemptions from its rules, which allowed members more easily to travel to and work in Geneva. 
 
* Manatt/Ahn Professor of International Law, George Washington University, and member of the UN 
International Law Commission.  
1 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Seventy-Second Session, UN GAOR, 76th 
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 1–2, paras. 1, 4, UN Doc. A/76/10 (2021 advance version) [hereinafter 2021 Report]. the final 
version of the 2021 report will be available by September 2021. This report and other International Law Commission 
documents are available online at http://legal.un.org/ilc. In addition, UN documents are generally available online at 
https://documents.un.org/prod/ods.nsf/home.xsp. 
2 See Sean D. Murphy, Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Work of the International Law Commission, 
114 AJIL 726 (2020) [hereinafter Murphy, Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic]. 




Given the hybrid format, certain special procedures and working methods were agreed 
exceptionally. To accommodate those members participating online from the Americas, 
Commission meetings in the morning were limited in principle to “non-interactive” presentations 
by members before the plenary (recommended to last no more than twenty minutes), which were 
recorded and could be watched (or read) at a time convenient for members located around the 
world. By contrast, afternoon sessions were “interactive,” consisting mainly of either the adoption 
of decisions by the plenary or the work of the drafting committee. To participate in these interactive 
meetings online, some members had to work very early or very late in the day depending on their 
location. The online platform used by the Commission was Zoom, and members wishing to speak 
could literally raise their hand (if the member was in Geneva) or could electronically do so (if the 
member was participating online). In order to save time, “informal consultations” (chaired by 
special rapporteurs) took place during parts of some mornings that would otherwise have been 
unused.    
 
Overall, the difficulties presented by the pandemic resulted in the Commission making 
much greater use of electronic means for distribution of materials to members and their assistants. 
Even members located in Geneva had to rely on such means given pandemic-related restrictions 
at the Palais des Nations (where the Commission met) on the distribution of paper. Of particular 
interest was the use in the drafting committee of electronic screens for displaying proposed textual 
changes by the special rapporteurs or members, which were intended to allow members in-person 
or remote to follow the proposals more easily.  
 
It is possible that the use of such technologies will accelerate to some extent the 
improvements that the Commission was already making in its methods of work. At the same time, 
it is unlikely that remote participation by members will continue once the pandemic subsides; in 
any event, in-person interactions are likely viewed as optimal for members to identify and bridge 
the gaps among differing views. 
 
II. PROVISIONAL APPLICATION OF TREATIES 
 
 The Commission completed the second reading of the topic provisional application of 
treaties,4 based on a sixth report by the special rapporteur, Juan Manuel Gómez-Robledo (Mexico)5 
 
4 For the text of the draft guidelines, see id. at 62–64; for the draft annex, see id. at 64–78; for the guidelines 
with commentary, see id. at 78–99; for a bibliography, see id. at 99–107.   
5  International Law Commission, Sixth Report on the Provisional Application of Treaties, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/738 (Feb. 24, 2020) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Juan Manuel Gómez-Robledo) [hereinafter Sixth 
Report on Provisional Application of Treaties].  For discussion of prior work on these draft guidelines, see Sean 
D. Murphy, The Expulsion of Aliens and Other Topics: The Sixty-Fourth Session of the International Law 
Commission, 107 AJIL 164, 171–73 (2013) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Fourth Session]; Sean D. Murphy, 
Immunity Ratione Personae of Foreign Government Officials and Other Topics: The Sixty-Fifth Session of the 
International Law Commission, 108 AJIL 41, 53–54 (2014) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Fifth Session]; Sean D. 
Murphy, The Expulsion of Aliens (Revisited) and Other Topics: The Sixty-Sixth Session of the International Law 
Commission, 109 AJIL 125, 143–44 (2015) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Sixth Session]; Sean D. Murphy, 
Identification of Customary International Law and Other Topics: The Sixty-Seventh Session of the International 
Law Commission, 109 AJIL 822, 822–32 (2015) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Seventh Session]; Sean D. Murphy, 
Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters and Other Topics: The Sixty-Eighth Session of the International 
Law Commission, 110 AJIL 718, 742–45 (2016) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Eighth Session]; Sean D. Murphy, 
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and on comments received from governments and international organizations regarding the text 
and commentary adopted at first reading in 2018.6 The outcome of this topic is twelve draft 
guidelines with commentary, as well as a draft annex, collectively referred to as the Guide to 
Provisional Application of Treaties.  
 
 While changes were made to the first reading text, they were relatively modest. Whereas 
the first reading text was silent in draft guideline 1 as to the actors engaged in provisional 
application of treaties, the final text refers to such application “by States and international 
organizations.”7  Draft guideline 4 on “Form of agreement” retains the basic elements identified 
in the first reading, albeit somewhat reformulated. It acknowledges in an opening clause that a 
treaty that is being applied provisionally might itself address provisional application, and further 
that such agreement may be in a separate treaty, but the draft guideline then goes on to elaborate 
other ways that an agreement on provisional application may be formed by other “means or 
arrangements,” including through a resolution adopted at an international organization, or through 
a declaration by a state that is accepted by the other states (or international organizations) 
concerned.8 While the draft guideline may be helpful to states and international organizations by 
identifying these more exotic forms, it may be considered somewhat unbalanced; virtually all 
agreements on provisional application may be found in the treaty itself that is being provisionally 
applied or in a side agreement; very few (if any) examples may be found of provisional application 
in the form of a resolution adopted at an international organization or by a declaration of a state 
accepted by others.9  
 
Crimes against Humanity and Other Topics: The Sixty-Ninth Session of the International Law Commission, 111 
AJIL 970,  978–80 (2017) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Ninth Session]; Sean D. Murphy, Anniversary 
Commemoration and Work of the International Law Commission’s Seventieth Session, 113 AJIL 90, 97–100 
(2019) [hereinafter Murphy, Seventieth Session]; Sean D. Murphy, Peremptory Norms of General International 
Law (Jus Cogens) and Other Topics: The Seventy-First Session of the International Law Commission, 114 
American Journal of International Law 68, 85 (2020) [hereinafter Murphy, Seventy-First Session]. 
6 Provisional application of treaties: Comments and observations received from Governments and international 
organizations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/737 (Feb. 14, 2020). 
7 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 62 (guideline 1). 
8 Id. at 62 (guideline 4). 
9 For the Commission’s commentary on international organization resolutions, see id. at 87, para. (6); for the 
commentary on the “exceptional possibility” of a state’s declaration that is “expressly accepted” by other states, see 
id. at 87–88, para. (7). With respect to the latter form, the special rapporteur pointed in his second and third reports 
to Syria’s declaration accepting provisional application of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) prior to Syria’s accession 
to that treaty. The circumstances of that incident, however, might be best understood as involving a unilateral 
declaration by Syria that established a legal obligation upon it, rather than an agreement on provisional application 
reached between Syria and all CWC states parties (which would have established rights and obligations for all the 
states concerned), given that there was no express acceptance by such states. See generally Marie Jacobsson, Syria 
and the Issue of Chemical Weapons: A Snapshot of a Legal Time Frame: The United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (2118) and the OPCW Executive Council Decision, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CHANGING 
PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY: LIBER AMICORUM SAID MAHMOUDI 134 (Jonas Ebbesson, Marie Jacobsson, Mark 
Klamberg, David Langlet & Pål Wrange eds., 2014). In any event, the Commission’s commentary is neutral as to 
how best to understand the Syrian incident, simply indicating that it is “an example” of a state making a unilateral 
declaration about provisional application, see 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 62, n. 278, without resolving whether 
that declaration thereafter fell within the legal regime of provisional application or, alternatively, fell within the legal 
regime of unilateral declarations of states creating legal obligations. On the latter possibility, see Guiding Principles 
Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, YEARBOOK OF THE 




 Perhaps the most important draft guideline remains draft guideline 6, on “legal effect,” 
which was reformulated somewhat to read: 
 
The provisional application of a treaty or a part of a treaty produces a legally binding 
obligation to apply the treaty or a part thereof between the States or international 
organizations concerned, except to the extent that the treaty otherwise provides or it is 
otherwise agreed. Such treaty or part of a treaty that is being applied provisionally must be 
performed in good faith.10 
 
The principal changes to the text of draft guideline 6 involved dropping of the phrase “as if the 
treaty were in force” before “between the States,” which was viewed both as unnecessary and as 
creating confusion with the treaty’s actual entry into force, and the addition of the second sentence 
on good faith. That sentence did not exist at first reading, but was viewed by the Commission as a 
second type of legal effect arising from an agreement on provisional application, inspired by article 
26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).11  
 
 One theme of the ILC’s work on this topic concerned to what extent the rules of the VCLT 
should be seen as generally applicable to provisional application. Some members viewed many, if 
not most, of the VCLT rules as applicable or potentially applicable, while others viewed 
provisional application of treaties as a sui generis situation, where on the basis of existing practice 
only relatively few rules present in the VCLT could be viewed as relevant (for example, while the 
rule on pacta sunt servanda applies to an agreement on provisional application, the elaborate 
VCLT rules on termination and suspension of that agreement may not apply). This debate played 
out to a degree in draft guideline 7 on “reservations,” where the first reading text contained two 
paragraphs asserting that the VCLT’s rules on reservations applied mutatis mutandis to provisional 
application of treaties. Criticism by states and others that there existed no discernible practice 
supporting the ILC’s position resulted in much more modest second reading text: “The present 
draft guidelines are without prejudice to any question concerning reservations relating to the 
provisional application of a treaty or a part of a treaty.”12   
 
 A similar shift occurred with respect to draft guideline 9. Its first two paragraphs indicate 
two ways that termination may occur:  upon entry into force of the treaty between the states or 
international organizations concerned; and—unless it is otherwise agreed—upon notification by a 
state (or international organization) of its intention not to become a party,.13 Those paragraphs 
reflect the text of the VCLT on provisional application.14 A third paragraph as formulated at first 
reading provided that the draft guideline was “without prejudice to the application, mutatis 
mutandis, of the relevant rules set forth in part V, section 3,” of the VCLT. That “without 
prejudice” clause was transformed at second reading so as to avoid any reference to the detailed 
termination and suspension rules of the VCLT. Instead, the relevant provision reads: “Unless the 
treaty otherwise provides or it is otherwise agreed, a State or an international organization may 
 
10 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 62 (guideline 6). 
11 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679 (1969) 
[hereinafter VCLT]. 
12 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 63 (guideline 7). 
13 Id. at 63 (guideline 9, paras. 1 and 2). 
14 VCLT, supra note 11, art. 25(2). 
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invoke other grounds for terminating provisional application, in which case it shall notify the other 
States or international organizations concerned.”15 This provision usefully recognizes what is 
probably understood in practice, which is that a state may terminate provisional application for 
any reason upon notice (and thus not solely in circumstances where it does not intend to become a 
party to the treaty), unless the agreement on provisional application provides otherwise. At the 
same time, a fourth paragraph was added indicating that such termination “does not affect any 
right, obligation or legal situation created through the execution of such provisional application 
prior to its termination.”16 
The annex to the Guide was originally envisaged as consisting of “model clauses,” whereby 
the Commission would adopt specially-crafted texts that could be used by states and international 
organizations in future agreements.  At second reading, however, it was decided that it was difficult 
to craft such clauses out of the context of the particular agreement for which the clause was being 
used. Consequently, the Commission opted instead to develop an annex containing examples of 
existing provisions from treaties and other instruments, by which states and international 
organizations have agreed on provisional application of a treaty. The examples, which are drawn 
from instruments such as the Arms Trade Treaty17 or the U.S.-Liberia agreement on suppressing 
weapons of mass destruction,18 are grouped into various categories designed to illuminate saliant 
aspects of an agreement on provisional application: the commencement of provisional 
application;19 the form of the agreement on provisional application (such as a side agreement or 
an exchange of diplomatic notes);20 the method by which a state or international organization may 
opt into or opt out of provisional application;21 the conditioning of provisional application by 
limitations derived from internal law (or from rules of international organizations);22 and the 
termination of provisional application.23  
 
The Commission decided to recommend that the General Assembly take note of the Guide, 
encourage its widest possible dissemination, and commend it to the attention of States and 
international organizations.24 It also requested the Secretary-General to publish the practice of 
States and international organizations. 
 
III. PROTECTION OF THE ATMOSPHERE 
 
The Commission also completed the second reading of the topic protection of the 
atmosphere,25 based on a sixth report by the special rapporteur, Shinya Murase (Japan),26 and on 
 
15 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 63 (guideline 9, para. 3).  
16 Id. (guideline 9, para. 4). 
17 Arms Trade Treaty, Apr. 2, 2013, art. 23, 3013 UNTS, No. 52373 (not yet published). 
18 Agreement Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their 
Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea, Liberia-U.S., Feb. 11, 2004, art. 17, 2963 UNTS 23. 
19 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 64–70 (annex, sect. A). 
20 Id. at 70–71 (annex, sect. B). 
21 Id. at 71–72 (annex, sect. C). 
22 Id. at 72–74 (annex, sect. D). 
23 Id. at 74–78 (annex, sect. E). 
24 Id. at 61, para. 49. 
25 For the text of the draft guidelines, see id. at 13–15; for the guidelines with commentary, see id. at 16–59.   
26 See International Law Commission, Sixth Report on the Protection of the Atmosphere, UN Doc. A/CN.4/736 
(Feb. 11, 2020) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Shinya Murase). For discussion of prior work on this topic, see 
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comments received from governments and international organizations regarding the text and 
commentary adopted at first reading in 2018.27 The outcome of this topic is a draft preamble and 
twelve draft guidelines with commentary. 
 
In the draft preamble, the Commission decided to change the clause stating that “protection 
of the atmosphere from atmospheric degradation and atmospheric pollution is a pressing concern 
of the international community as a whole” to provide instead that “atmospheric degradation and 
atmospheric pollution are a common concern of humankind.”28 That change was prompted by 
some comments received from governments and by the use of such phrase in some instruments in 
the field of international environmental law, including the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate 
change.29 Concern about the expression being interpreted as having legal significance resulted in 
the Commission carefully explaining its meaning in the commentary, essentially characterizing 
the expression as simply identifying a factual situation (concern by states about an environmental 
problem prompting a desire for their cooperation) rather than as having any legally-operative 
effects (such as creating or entailing rights or obligations). The commentary states: 
 
The phrase as used in this preambular paragraph reflects a concern of the entire 
international community that all may be affected by atmospheric pollution and atmospheric 
degradation, as defined in the draft guidelines.  It is recalled that the expression has 
commonly been used in the field of environmental law, even though doctrine is divided on 
its scope, content and consequences. It is understood that the expression identifies a 
problem that requires cooperation from the entire international community, while at the 
same time that its inclusion does not create, as such, rights and obligations, and, in 
particular, that it does not entail erga omnes obligations in the context of the draft 
guidelines.30 
 
Continuing concern that the draft guidelines not be regarded as a basis for interfering with 
carefully-negotiated, existing treaties or with complex future negotiations relating to the 
atmosphere resulted in the recrafting of the final draft preambular paragraph to read: “Recalling 
that the present draft guidelines were elaborated on the understanding that they were not intended 
to interfere with relevant political negotiations or to impose on current treaty regimes rules or 
principles not already contained therein.”31 In this regard, it is noted that a proposal at second 
reading by the special rapporteur  to include a new paragraph that failure of states to implement 
their obligations under international law relating to protection of the atmosphere “entails the 
responsibility of States”32 was not adopted. 
 
 
Murphy, Sixty-Fifth Session, supra note 5, at 56–57; Murphy, Sixty-Sixth Session, supra note 5, at 139; Murphy, Sixty-
Seventh Session, supra note 5, at 832–35; Murphy, Sixty-Eighth Session, supra note 5, at 729–30; Murphy, Sixty-Ninth 
Session, supra note 5, at 980–81; Murphy, Seventieth Session, supra note 5, at 96–97. 
27 Protection of the atmosphere: Comments and observations received from Governments and international 
organizations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/735 (Feb. 11, 2020). 
28 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 13 (draft preamble, para 3). 
29 Paris Agreement, pmbl., para. 11, Dec. 12, 2015, 55 ILM 740 (2016). 
30 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 18–19, para. (3) (commentary to draft preamble, para. 3). 
31 Id. at 13 (draft preamble, para. 8). 
32 Sixth Report, supra note 26, at para. 87. 
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The definition of “atmospheric pollution” in draft guideline 1 was altered so as to include 
the release into the atmosphere of not just substances, but also “energy,” but the definition was 
simultaneously limited to encompass only releases contributing to “significant” deleterious effects 
extending beyond the state of origin that endanger human life and health, or the environment.33  
 
The heart of the draft guidelines is likely draft guideline 3, which contains a heavily 
caveated “obligation to protect the atmosphere,” left unchanged from the first reading: “States 
have the obligation to protect the atmosphere by exercising due diligence in taking appropriate 
measures, in accordance with applicable rules of international law, to prevent, reduce or control 
atmospheric pollution and atmospheric degradation.”34 The reason for the caveats is likely that 
such an obligation does not exist in any treaty, nor is it possible to say that widespread state practice 
in conjunction with opinio juris demonstrates the existence of such a rule in customary 
international law.35 Arguably, the phrase “in accordance with applicable rules of international law” 
means that the draft guideline simply restates the obligation of states parties to abide by their treaty 
commitments. 
 
The Commission decided to recommend that the General Assembly take note of the draft 
guidelines, annex them to a resolution, ensure their widest possible dissemination, and commend 
them to “the attention of States, international organizations and all who may be called upon to deal 
with the subject.”36 
 
IV. OTHER TOPICS ADDRESSED DURING THE SEVENTIETH SESSION 
   
Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction 
 
The topic on immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction remains the 
longest one on the current program of work of the Commission.37  Prior to the present session, the 
Commission had adopted several draft articles: draft article 1 (scope); draft article 2 (definitions) 
(adopted in part); draft article 3 (persons enjoying immunity ratione personae); draft article 4 
(scope of immunity ratione personae); draft article 5 (persons enjoying immunity ratione 
materiae); draft article 6 (scope of immunity ratione materiae); draft article 7 (crimes under 
 
33 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 13 (draft guideline 1(b)). 
34 Id. at 14 (draft guideline 3) (emphasis added). 
35 While commentary asserts that draft guideline 3 “restates the obligation to protect the atmosphere,” id., at 
30, para (1), the commentary does not point to any such obligation in existing treaties, nor analyzes state practice 
and opinio juris in support of it. The commentary points to a “genesis” of such an obligation in the Trail Smelter 
arbitration and Stockholm Declaration Principle 21, id., at 30–31, para (3), but those sources do not concern damage 
to the atmosphere as such, but damage by one state to the environment of another state (or to areas beyond national 
jurisdiction). The commentary also asserts that the phrase “prevent, reduce or control” draws upon formulations 
contained in five conventions, id., at 32, para (7), n. 80–81 but none of those conventions refers to an “obligation to 
protect the atmosphere”; rather, they regulate in specific ways particular types of emissions into the atmosphere 
because those emissions result in specific types of harm to humans or the environment. 
36 Id. at 12, para. 37. 
37 For discussion of prior work on this topic, see Murphy, Sixty-Fourth Session, supra note 5, 169−71; Murphy, 
Sixty-Fifth Session, supra note 5, at 41–48; Murphy, Sixty-Sixth Session, supra note 5, at 139–40; Murphy, Sixty-
Seventh Session, supra note 5, at 842; Murphy, Sixty-Eighth Session, supra note 5, at 732−42; Murphy, Sixty-Ninth 
Session, supra note 5, at 981–88; Murphy, Seventieth Session, supra note 5, at 106; Murphy, Seventy-First Session, 
supra note 5, at 81–82. 
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international law in respect of which immunity ratione materiae shall not apply); and an annex 
(list of treaties referred to in draft article 7, paragraph 2). 38  While there was hope that the 
Commission might complete the first reading of this topic at the present session, it did not, and 
hence will seek to do so at the 73rd session. 
 
At the outset of the session, numerous draft articles remained pending in the drafting 
committee. Work was completed on several of those draft articles, which (along with commentary) 
were provisionally adopted by the Commission. In addition to draft article 8 ante, 39  the 
Commission adopted five draft articles setting forth procedures to be followed by the forum state 
and the state of the official, specifically draft 8 (examination of immunity by the forum state); draft 
article 9 (notification of the state of the official); draft article 10 (invocation of immunity); draft 
article 11 (waiver of immunity); and draft article 12 (requests for information).40 The general thrust 
of these draft articles is to require the forum state to examine at an early stage whether an issue of 
immunity has arisen, and to notify the state of the official before the forum state initiates criminal 
proceedings or takes coercive measures against the official. The state of the official may then either 
invoke or waive the immunity of the official. Either state may request information from the other 
state to assist in such steps.  
 
These draft articles are the prelude to an anticipated draft article 13 on the forum state’s 
“determination of immunity,” which is to be made in light of the reaction (if any) of the state of 
the official. Among other things, such determination might be conditioned in various ways. For 
example, in the absence of a waiver and at least in the context of applying draft article 7, draft 
article 13 might require—before denying immunity—that the official be present in the forum state, 
that the evidence of the official committing the alleged offence be fully conclusive, and that the 
determination be taken at the highest possible level of governmental or prosecutorial authority.41 
 
Work was not completed in the drafting committee on certain other pending draft articles, 
specifically: definitions in draft article 2 for “criminal jurisdiction,” “immunity from foreign 
criminal jurisdiction,” “immunity ratione personae,” and “immunity ratione materiae”; draft 
article 14 (transfer of proceedings to the State of the official); draft article 15 (consultations); and 
draft article 16 (fair and impartial treatment of the official). Draft article 14 may also include a 
pertinent safeguard, if it requires transfer of the official from the forum state to the state of the 
official whenever the latter is able and willing to submit the matter to prosecution before its own 
courts (or if the two states agree, to a competent international criminal court). 
 
 
38 See 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 122–23, 125 (draft articles 1–7 and draft annex). 
39 This draft article was adopted by the drafting committee during the 71st session, see Murphy, Seventy-First 
Session, supra note 5, at 81–82, but was only adopted by the Commission at the 72nd session. See 2121 Report, 
supra note 1, at 123 (draft article 8 ante). 
40 See 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 124–25 (draft articles 8–12); for the commentary to these draft articles, see 
id. at 126–51. 
41 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Seventieth Session, UN GAOR, 73rd 
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 292, para. 323, UN Doc. A/73/10 (Sept. 3, 2018). 
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At the present session, the Commission also had before it the eighth report on the topic 
submitted by its second special rapporteur for this topic, Concepción Escobar Hernández (Spain).42 
In the report, the special rapporteur proposed a means for settling disputes between the forum state 
and the state of the official. Specifically, draft article 17 would provide for consultations between 
the two states and, if the dispute remains unresolved, for negotiations; if it still remained 
unresolved,  either party could “suggest” reference of the dispute to arbitration or to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ).43  The report also examined the relationship between the 
immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction and international criminal 
tribunals,44 and in particular considered the judgment of the Appeals Chamber of the International 
Criminal Court in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir case.45  Among other things, the special 
rapporteur noted that “the assessment made of the judgment from different academic positions and 
by some States and the Court itself has not been kind.”46 Ultimately, the special rapporteur only 
proposed a draft article 18 that reads: “The present draft articles are without prejudice to the rules 
governing the functioning of international criminal tribunals.”47 After the report was debated in 
the Commission, both draft articles were referred to the drafting committee, where they remain 
pending. 
 
Succession of States in respect of State Responsibility 
 
In 2016, the Commission moved the topic of succession of states in respect of state 
responsibility onto the current program of work and appointed Pavel Šturma (Czech Republic) as 
special rapporteur. Generally speaking, this topic is analyzing the rules on state responsibility 
applicable to the rights and obligations of a predecessor state, a successor state, and third states, in 
situations where a succession of states occurs. The Commission in 2019 provisionally adopted 
draft article 1 (scope), draft article 2 (use of terms), and draft article 5 (cases of succession 
covered),48 and in 2021 provisionally adopted draft article 7 (acts having a continuing character), 
draft article 8 (attribution of conduct of an insurrectional or other movement), and draft article 9 
(cases of succession of states when the predecessor state continues to exist).49 Draft article 3 
(relevance of agreements to succession of states in respect of state responsibility) and draft article 
4 (unilateral declaration by a successor state) remain pending in the drafting committee.50 
 
A continuing feature of the work on this topic is the divide between members who favor 
recognizing succession by successor states to the responsibility originally incurred by a 
predecessor state (an “automatic succession” rule), and those members who favor recognizing that 
there is no such obligation (a “blank slate” rule). Resolving that divide has proven difficult in the 
 
42  International Law Commission, Eighth Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal 
Jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/CN.4/739 (Feb. 28, 2020) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Concepción Escobar 
Hernández) [hereinafter Eighth Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction].  
43 Id. at para. 54. 
44 Id. at paras. 20–31. 
45 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, Judgment in the 
Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, ICC-02/05-01/09-397-Corr (May 6, 2019). 
46 Eighth Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 42, at para. 23.  
47 Id. at para. 32. 
48 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 164 (draft articles 1–2, 5). 
49 Id. at 165 (draft articles 7–9). For the commentary to these draft articles, see id. at 165–69. 
50 For discussion of prior work on this topic, see Murphy, Sixty-Ninth Session, supra note 5, at 990–92; Murphy, 
Seventieth Session, supra note 5, 104–06; Murphy, Seventy-First Session, supra note 5, at 78–81. 
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face of the relatively sparse and sometimes conflicting state practice, often involving arguably sui 
generis agreements among the states concerned.  In that light, at the present session the drafting 
committee considered three draft articles that remained pending from the 71st session relating to 
obligations arising in three types of succession scenarios: the uniting of states (e.g., the United 
Arab Republic in 1958); the incorporation of one state in another (e.g., the unification of Germany 
in 1990); and dissolution of a state (e.g., the former Yugoslavia beginning in 1990). For each 
scenario, the drafting committee ultimately adopted neither an automatic succession rule nor a 
blank slate rule, but instead a rule that the states concerned “shall agree on how to address the 
injury.” Such agreement presumably might involve full, partial or no reparation.51  
 
Specifically, draft article 10 on “Uniting of States” provides: “When two or more States 
unite and so form one successor State, and an internationally wrongful act has been committed by 
any of the predecessor States, the injured State and the successor State shall agree on how to 
address the injury.”52 Draft article 10 bis, on “Incorporation of a State into another State,” provides 
in paragraph 1: “When an internationally wrongful act has been committed by a State prior to its 
incorporation into another State which continues to exist, the injured State and the incorporating 
State shall agree on how to address the injury.”53 Draft article 11 on “Dissolution of a State” 
provides: 
 
When a State that has committed an internationally wrongful act dissolves and ceases 
to exist and the parts of the territory of the predecessor State form two or more successor 
States, the injured State and the relevant successor State or States shall agree on how to 
address the injury arising from the internationally wrongful act. They should take into 
account any territorial link, any benefit derived, any equitable apportionment, and all other 
relevant circumstances.54 
 
At the present session, the Commission also had before it the fourth report of the special 
rapporteur, which focused on questions relating to the impact of succession of states on breaches 
 
51 See Succession of States in respect of State responsibility, Statement of the Chair of the Drafting Committee 
Ms. Patrícia Galvão Teles (July 28, 2021), at 
https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/statements/2021_dc_chair_statement_sosr.pdf. For example, with 
respect to the formulation as used in draft article 10, the chair of the drafting committee maintained that the 
formulation “shall agree on how to address the injury” 
 
does not articulate a “clean slate” rule or an automatic succession rule. Instead, it is intended to encourage 
States to seek a solution to questions of international responsibility in situations of a merger between States. 
The formulation of the wording is meant to be sufficiently flexible to give States the freedom to choose the 
modalities of the agreement. Such flexibility could even result in agreement between the injured State and 
the successor State that it was not possible to address the injury. 
 
Id. at 5. 
52 Succession of States in respect of State responsibility: Text of draft articles 10, 10 bis and 11 provisionally 
adopted by the Drafting Committee at the seventy-second session, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.954 (July 19, 2021) (draft 
article 10). 
53 Id. (draft article 10 bis(1)). A second paragraph simply confirms that when “an internationally wrongful act 
has been committed by a State prior to incorporating another State, the responsibility of the State that committed the 
wrongful act is not affected by such incorporation.” Id. (draft article 10 bis(2)). 
54 Id. (draft article 11). 
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of a composite character, on reparation, and on assurances of non-repetition.55 Those draft articles 
were referred to,56 but remain pending in, the drafting committee. To assist in its work, the 
Commission requested information from states on their treaties, national laws, and court decisions 
relating to this topic.57 
 
General Principles of Law 
 
 In 2018, the Commission moved the topic of general principles of law onto the current 
program of work and appointed Marcelo Vázquez-Bermúdez (Ecuador) as special rapporteur.58 
Generally speaking, this topic is analyzing the third source of international law, as reflected in ICJ 
Statute article 38(1)(c): “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”59 At the 
request of the Commission, its Secretariat produced a detailed memorandum surveying the case 
law of inter-state arbitral tribunals and international criminal courts and tribunals of a universal 
character, as well as treaties, which are relevant to work on the topic.60 
 
 At the 71st session, the drafting committee had adopted the English-language text of draft 
conclusion 1 on the scope of the topic, which states that the topic “concerns general principles of 
law as a source of international law.” 61  At the 72nd session, the Commission adopted draft 
conclusion 1 (in all languages), having resolved an issue with the French and Spanish texts.62 
  
          The Commission also adopted draft conclusion 2, entitled “Recognition,” which provides: 
“For a general principle of law to exist, it must be recognized by the community of nations.”63 
Two important aspects of this draft conclusion merit attention. First, as indicated by the 
commentary, it reaffirms that recognition is “the essential condition for the emergence of a general 
principle of law.”64 Anyone called upon to apply such a general principle of law must “examine 
all the available evidence showing that its recognition has taken place,” with the specific and 
objective criteria for doing so to be developed in the subsequent draft conclusions.65 Second, the 
draft conclusion drops the word “civilized” from the language that appears in the ICJ’s Statute, 
and replaces it instead with “the community of”. The commentary to this draft conclusion explains: 
 
(3) Draft conclusion 2 employs the term “community of nations” as a substitute for the 
term “civilized nations” found in Article 38, paragraph 1 (c), of the Statute of the 
 
55  See International Law Commission, Fourth Report on Succession of States in Respect of State 
Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/743 (Mar. 27, 2020) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Pavel Šturma). 
56 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 154, para. 123. 
57 Id. at 9, para. 25. 
58 For discussion of prior work on this topic, see Murphy, Seventy-First Session, supra note 5, at 82–84. 
59 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(c). 
60 General principles of law: Memorandum by the Secretariat, UN Doc. A/CN.4/742 (May 12, 2020). 
61 See 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 182 (draft conclusion 1). 
62 There was initially disagreement within the Commission on the French and Spanish texts.  Whereas the ICJ 
Statute refers to “principes généraux de droit” and “principios generales de derecho”, the terms “du droit” and “del 
derecho” have also been used in some more recent texts identifying this source of international law. The 
Commission decided to use the latter terms for the purposes of this topic, but it was understood that doing so did not 
imply any difference with the substance of ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(c). See id. at 183, n. 426.   
63 Id. at 182 (draft conclusion 2). 




International Court of Justice, because the latter term is anachronistic. The term 
“community of nations” is found in article 15, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, a treaty to which 173 States are parties and which is thus 
widely accepted. The term used in the authentic languages of the Covenant is replicated in 
the different language versions of draft conclusion 2. …. By employing this formulation, 
the draft conclusion aims to stress that all nations participate equally, without any kind of 
distinction, in the formation of general principles of law, in accordance with the principle 
of sovereign equality set out in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations.  
 
(4) The use of the term “community of nations” is not intended to modify the scope or 
content of Article 38, paragraph 1 (c), of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
In particular, the term does not seek to suggest that there is a need for a unified or collective 
recognition of a general principle of law, nor does it suggest that general principles of law 
can only arise within the international legal system. Furthermore, the term “community of 
nations” should not be confused with the term “international community of States as a 
whole” found in article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, relating to 
peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens).66 
 
 Work in the drafting committee on draft conclusion 3 was suspended due to the continuing 
disagreement among members as to whether “general principles of law” comprise only those 
principles derived from national legal systems, or may also include those formed within the 
international legal system.67  The special rapporteur’s proposal for draft conclusion 3 recognizes 
both possibilities68  and so was set aside for the time being.  
 
 At the present session, the Commission had before it the second report of the special 
rapporteur, in which he proposed several new draft conclusions. 69  The drafting committee 
completed work on and the Commission adopted draft conclusion 4, entitled “Identification of 
general principles of law derived from national legal systems.” It provides that to “determine the 
existence and content of a general principle of law derived from national legal systems, it is 
necessary to ascertain: (a) the existence of a principle common to the various legal systems of the 
world; and (b) its transposition to the international legal system.”70  The commentary indicates that 
the first part of this two-step analysis is “essentially inductive”; one must show that a legal 
principle is found in the various legal systems of the world.71 The expression “various legal 
systems of the world” is, according to the commentary, “an inclusive and broad expression, 
covering the variety and diversity of the legal systems of the world.”72 The second part refers to 
the determination that a principle common to the various legal systems of the world “can be applied 
 
66 Id. at 184, paras. (3)–(4) (commentary to draft conclusion 2). 
67 See id. at paras. 210–15 (summary of debate at the 72nd session on this issue); see also Murphy, Seventy-
First Session, supra note 5, at 82–84. 
68 See International Law Commission, First Report on General Principles of Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/732, at 67–
73 (Apr. 5, 2019) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Marcelo Vázquez-Bermúdez). 
69 International Law Commission, Second Report on General Principles of Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/741 (Apr. 9, 
2021) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Marcelo Vázquez-Bermúdez) [hereinafter Second Report on General 
Principles of Law]. 
70 See 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 182 (draft conclusion 4). 




in the international legal system,” a recognition that such a principle (or some elements of a 
principle) “may not be suitable” for such application.73 
 
 The drafting committee also adopted draft conclusion 5, but it has not yet been adopted by 
the Commission. Entitled “Determination of the existence of a principle common to the various 
legal systems of the world,” draft conclusion 5 reads: 
 
1. To determine the existence of a principle common to the various legal systems of the 
world, a comparative analysis of national legal systems is required.  
 
2. The comparative analysis must be wide and representative, including the different 
regions of the world.  
 
3. The comparative analysis includes an assessment of national laws and decisions of 
national courts, and other relevant materials.74 
 
The special rapporteur’s other proposals that remain pending in the drafting committee are: 
draft conclusion 6 (ascertainment of transposition to the international legal system); draft 
conclusion 7 (identification of general principles of law formed within the international legal 
system; draft conclusion 8 (decisions of courts and tribunals); and draft conclusion 9 (teachings).75 
Of these, draft conclusion 7 may be the most interesting—and the most controversial given the 
disagreement among the members indicated above. The proposal reads: 
 
To determine the existence and content of a general principle of law formed within the 
international legal system, it is necessary to ascertain that: 
 
(a) a principle is widely recognized in treaties and other international instruments; 
 
(b) a principle underlies general rules of conventional or customary international law; or 
 
(c) a principle is inherent in the basic features and fundamental requirements of the 
international legal system.76 
   
Sea-Level Rise in Relation to International Law 
 
 At the seventy-first session, the Commission placed on its current program of work the 
topic of sea-level rise in relation to international law, to be addressed in the context of a study 
group, which is open to all members. 77 The topic was proposed by a group of ILC members who 
are serving as co-chairs of the study group: Bogdan Aurescu (Romania); Yacouba Cissé (Côte 
 
73 Id. at 185, paras. (4)–(7) (commentary to draft conclusion 4). 
74 General principles of law: Addendum: Text and title of draft conclusion 5, provisionally adopted by the 
Drafting Committee, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.955/Add.1 (July 29, 2021). 
75 Second Report, supra note 69, at 57–58. 
76 Id. at 57 (proposed draft conclusion 7). 
77 For discussion of prior consideration of this topic, see Murphy, Seventieth Session, supra note 5, 107–08; 
Murphy, Seventy-First Session, supra note 5, at 84–85. 
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d’Ivoire); Patricia Galvão Teles (Portugal); Nilüfer Oral (Turkey); and Juan José Ruda Santolaria 
(Peru). 
 
 For the present session, it was decided that the study group would focus on issues relating 
to the law of the sea. Consequently, two of the co-chairs (Aurescu and Oral) prepared a “first issues 
paper”,78 which served as the basis for the study group’s work. A central aspect of the paper’s 
analysis concerned whether the baselines of a coastal state should move when sea-level rise occurs 
(“ambulatory baselines”) or whether they may remain fixed (“permanent baselines”).  The two co-
chairs concluded that “nothing prevents Member States from depositing notifications, in 
accordance with the [UN Convention on the Law of the Sea], regarding the baselines and outer 
limits of maritime zones measured from the baselines and, after the negative effects of sea-level 
rise occur, to stop updating these notifications in order to preserve their entitlements.”79 The 
underlying reason for such a conclusion appears to be equity owed to the coastal state, given that 
“the landward movement of the baseline and the outer limits of maritime zones would result in the 
coastal State losing sovereignty and jurisdiction rights over regulating the navigation of third States 
and their nationals.”80 Moreover, with respect to maritime boundaries, the co-chairs suggested that 
“in order to preserve legal stability, security, certainty and predictability, it is necessary to preserve 
existing maritime delimitations, either effected by agreement or by adjudication, notwithstanding 
the coastal changes produced by sea-level rise.”81 For similar reasons, the co-chairs implied that 
fully-entitled islands, rocks and low-tide elevations should not be reclassified based on sea-level 
rise, given that “[r]ecent international jurisprudence…lends support to the need to maintain the 
stability of maritime entitlements.”82 A third co-chair (Cissé) made a presentation at the session 
on the practice of African states, in which he concluded that such practice was diverse and that “it 
was not possible to infer the existence of opinio juris in favour or against permanent or ambulatory 
baselines or maritime boundaries.”83 
 
 The study group debated the report by the two co-chairs. While the meetings of the study 
group are not public, the discussions are summarized in the Commission’s annual report.84 Some 
concerns were expressed that the co-chairs’ paper had been interpreted outside the Commission as 
already reflecting the Commission’s views, when it was actually just the product of two 
members.85 While some members supported the co-chairs’ analysis, other members expressed 
doubts about the conclusions reached, and called for more rigorous study.86 Among other things, 
it was noted that: baselines are not established by coastal state charts or lists, but instead are 
established by the rules of the law of the sea;87 the normal baseline under the law of the sea is the 
 
78 Sea-level rise in relation to international law: First issues paper by Bogdan Aurescu and Nilüfer Oral, Co-
Chairs of the Study Group on sea-level rise in relation to international law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/740 (Feb. 28, 2020) 
[hereinafter “First issues paper on sea-level rise in relation to international law”]. For several corrections to the 
paper, see Corrigendum, UN Doc. A/CN.4/740/Corr.1 (Aug. 3, 2021).  
79 First issues paper on sea-level rise in relation to international law, supra note 78, at 41, para. 104(f). 
80 Id. at 67, para. 190(a). 
81 Id. at 54, para. 141(b). 
82 Id. at 79–80, para. 218. 
83 2121 Report, supra note 1, at paras. 259–61. 
84 Id. at 187−201, paras. 252−95. 
85 Id. at para. 191, para. 265. 
86 Id. at 266. 
87 Id. at 193, para. 270. 
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low-water line along the coast,88 which is inherently ambulatory and not fixed;89 the charts or lists 
indicated in article 16 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea only concern straight baselines 
or closing lines, not other baselines;90 even then, the straight baselines or closing lines shown on 
such charts or lists are to be “in accordance with” certain rules,91  such as the requirement that 
straight baselines “not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast”;92 
the interests of not just coastal states but of other states must also be considered,93  such as with 
respect to navigational, overflight and other freedoms; agreements and judicial decisions on 
maritime boundaries only bind the parties to such agreements or cases, and cannot affect the rights 
of third states with respect to maritime areas where a coastal state no longer has sovereignty or 
sovereign rights;94 any new rule based specifically on change of a coastline due to sea-level rise 
would need to consider that coastlines change due to many other factors (e.g., storms, waves, wind, 
or rainfall, all possibly aggravated by climate change), such that a basis for identifying a change 
that is unique to sea-level rise would be needed;95 and the maintenance of “stability” might entail 
following, rather than abandoning, the settled rules of the law of the sea, as a departure from them 
could result in states claiming unexpected maritime entitlements that have no relation to physical 
reality.96  
 
During the seventy-third session in 2022, the study group intends to focus on issues related 
to statehood and to the protection of persons affected by sea-level rise, rather than on issues relating 
to the law of the sea.97 Since its work will likely not be completed in this quinquennium, the study 
group is expected to be reconvened during the next quinquennium. To assist in the study group’s 
work, the Commission has requested information from states on their practice, treaties, national 
laws, and court decisions relating to this topic.98 
 
V. NEW TOPIC FOR THE LONG-TERM WORK PROGRAM 
 
During the seventy-second session, the Commission placed a new topic on its long-term 
work program, which concerns subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international 
law.99 Addition of this topic to the long-term work program may be seen in the context of the 
Commission in recent years addressing various matters related to the sources of international law, 
notably by its topics on: identification of customary international law (completed in 2018); 
subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties 
(completed in 2018); provisional application of treaties (completed in 2021); peremptory norms of 
 
88 See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
UNTS 396 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994), art. 5. 
89 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 193, para. 271. 
90 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 193, para. 270. 
91 Id.; see, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 88, art. 16 (referring to the 
baselines for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea “determined in accordance with articles 7, 9 and 10”). 
92 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 88, art. 7(3). 
93 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 194, at para. 277. 
94 Id. at 196, para. 281. 
95 Id. at 190, para. 263. 
96 Id. at 191, 193−94, paras. 266, 273. 
97 Id. at 201, para. 296. 
98 Id. at 9−10, paras. 26−28. 
99 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 202, para. 302.  
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general international law (jus cogens) (likely to be completed in 2022); and general principles of 
law (ongoing).  
 
It is recalled that ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(d) provides that, in resolving disputes, the Court 
shall apply, “subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination 
of rules of law.”100 According to the syllabus, prepared by Charles Jalloh (Sierra Leone),101 
 
there are aspects of these subsidiary means and their interaction and relationship to the 
sources that are uncertain, confusing, and arguably even unsettled. Consequently, in order 
not to leave a gap in the clarity, predictability and uniformity of international law, it is 
proposed that the Commission consider completing its systematic study of Article 38(1) by 
also examining the subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law 
listed in sub-paragraph (d)….102 
 
The degree and depth of such uncertainties are unclear, though the syllabus maintains that 
there are differences of views as to whether judicial decisions are solely a vehicle for finding 
international law (as opposed to being a direct source of international law),103 as well as questions 
as to the status of national court (as opposed to international court) decisions104 and the different 
roles national court decisions can play across different sources of law. 105  In any event, the 
Commission will now await reactions to this proposed topic by states and others to gauge the 




During the seventy-second session, the Commission held an election to fill a “casual 
vacancy,” meaning a vacancy arising during the course of the Commission’s quinquennium. In 
such a situation, the Commission’s Statute provides that, rather than an election being held at the 
UN General Assembly, the Commission itself shall fill the vacancy. 106  The vacancy was 
occasioned by the resignation from the Commission of Georg Nolte (Germany), who had been 
elected as an ICJ judge. A single candidate was advanced for election to fill this vacancy, Mathias 
Forteau (France), who had previously been a member of the Commission from 2012 to 2016. He 
was duly elected by the Commission on April 29 to serve for the remainder of the current 
quinquennium.107  
 
The current members of the Commission originally were to serve terms that would expire 
in 2021. However, after the COVID-19 pandemic precluded the Commission from meeting in 
 
100 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(d). Article 59 of the Statute provides that the 
“decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”  
101 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 210, Annex. 
102 Id. at 211, para. 6. 
103 Id. at 213, para. 13. 
104 Id., para. 14. 
105 Id., at 213–14, paras. 15–16. 
106 See the Statute of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/RES/174(II), annex, art. 11 (Nov. 21, 
1947). 
107 2121 Report, supra note 1, at 2, para. 3. 
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2020, the General Assembly voted to extend the current members’ term by one year, so as to end 
in 2022.108 Even so, the Secretary-General decided to move forward with election of the next 
Commission on the original schedule, such that the members of the next Commission will be 
elected in November 2021, but will not commence their five-year terms until January 2023.109 The 
candidate nominated by the United States is Evelyn Aswad, a former attorney at the U.S. 
Department of State Office of the Legal Adviser, and professor of international law at the 
University of Oklahoma College of Law.  
 
108 See Murphy, Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic, supra note 2. 
109 For information on the 2021 election, including the slate of candidates, see 2021 Election of the 
International Law Commission (updated July 16, 2021), https://legal.un.org/ilc/elections/2021election.shtml. 
